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I.

This

case

arnves

on

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
appeal

from

the

jury

verdict

entered

In

favor

of

Plaintiff/Counterdefendants/Respondents Profits Plus Capital Management, LLC ("PPCM" or
"Profits Plus"), and Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP ("Dollars and Sense" or the "Limited
Partnership"). Profits Plus, Dollars and Sense, and Robert Coleman commenced this action with
the filing of a Complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a decree that Jeffrey Podesta and
Street Search, LLC, had no ownership interest in Profits Plus or Dollars and Sense.

Jeffrey

Podesta and Street Search, LLC, responded with an answer and multiple counterclaims against
all Respondents.
The case was tried to a jury upon Appellants Street Search LLC's claim that Street
Search, LLC entered into a contract with Profits Plus for the transfer of a 50% co-general partner
interest in Dollars and Sense. By its unanimous verdict rendered on February 17, 2012, the jury
found that the Appellants failed to prove their Counterclaims for breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duty. 1 The trial court subsequently entered Judgment in favor of Respondents on all
claims and defenses asserted by Appellants and upon Respondents' claims for declaratory
judgment. In addition, the trial court denied Appellants' motions for new trial and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and granted Respondents their attorney fees and costs in the sum of
$193,526.77.
I Prior to the trial, Respondents filed three motions for summary judgment and successfully eliminated all
of the Counterclaims asserted by Jeffrey Podesta, an individual; all contract and fraud claims against
Dollars and Sense, and all contract claims against Robert Coleman. Appellants' claims for an Accounting
and Request for Apportionment of a Receiver (Counts V and VI), were never dismissed and remained
active as of the trial. Based upon the verdict of the jury, further consideration of Apellants'remaining
claims was rendered moot.

II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On February 17, 2012, after an eight-day jury trial, conducted over the course of two
weeks, the jury returned its unanimous Special Verdict, finding that Appellants failed to prove
the existence of a contract between Street Search and Profits Plus. R., p. 000697-700. Appellants
do not appeal from the jury verdict. Similarly, the list of issues that Appellants do not appeal, or
if appealed, do not support, is compelling: Appellants do not appeal from the vast majority of the
trial court's interlocutory rulings or orders, including, but not limited to, the trial court's rulings
upon (i) Respondents' motions for summary judgment; (ii) the trial court's order denying
Appellants' motion to add a claim for punitive damages; (iii) orders denying and granting
motions to compel discovery; (iv) all but one of the multiple motions in limine; (v) from the trial
court's order denying Appellants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the
Alternative for New Trial; and, (vi) from the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs to
Respondents.

2

Instead, Appellants attack discrete evidentiary issues in an effort to call into

question the validity of the very findings it does not appeal: the jury verdict.

In so doing,

Appellants ignore the standard of review that must guide this Court in its review of the issues
that are presented. Moreover, Appellants fail to support the majority of their arguments with
The trial court's written and verbal orders on these motions may be found in the record as follows:
(1) Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment - R., p. 000264-267;
(2) Order Granting Counterclaimant's Motion to Amend and Denying Motion to Amend to Include Punitive
Damages R., p. 000318-320;
(3) Order Granting [second motion for] Partial Summary Judgment R., p. 000339-341; Hr'g July 7,2011, Ht'g Tr.,
p. 43, 1. II p. 65, 1. 23;
(4) Memorandum Decision re: Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment R., p. 000355-359;
(5) Motions in limine, in pertinent part, Hrg January 19,2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 126-172;
(6) Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion for JNOV and New Trial- R., p, 000787-796; Tr., Vol. I, p. 305
p. 336; and,
(7) Memorandum Decision and Order re Attorney Fees R., p. 000797-807.
2

2

cogent authority or analysis, but instead ask the court to weigh the evidence and to second guess
the jury and trial judge.
Appellants also raise several issues in their notices of appeal which are wholly omitted
from Appellants' Brief, namely:
3. Whether the Trial Court erred when it entered declaratory
judgments on Counts 1, 2, and 3 of Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint;
4. Whether
there
was
good
cause
to
exclude
Defendants/Counterclaimants' expert witnesses or did Plaintiffs
Counsel's comments affect the substantial rights of the
Defendants/Counterclaimants;
6. Whether the verdict was in accord with the clear weight of the
evidence; and
7. Whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict.
R., p. 000782-786; R, p. 000823-827; and R., p. 001204-1207; cf Appellants Brief.
As noted by this Court in City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d 232
(2013), the Court "will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by propositions
of law, authority or argument.' " Id. at 237 (quoting Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 60, 244
P.3d 197, 204 (201O))Error! Bookmark not defined .. "Put another way, even if "an issue is
explicitly set forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only
mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be
considered by this Court.' " Id. (quoting Liponis v. Bach, 149 Idaho 372, 374, 234 P.3d 696,698
(2010))Error! Bookmark not defined..

As to the foregoing issues on appeal, Appellants
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provide no briefing and no authority which would enable meaningful review of these issues and
further consideration by this Court is therefore unnecessary.
In addition, to the extent Appellants now challenge the failure of the trial court to give
jury instructions, Appellants did not request the jury instructions they now claim were refused
and further failed to object to the lack of the same. Consequently, issues with respect to jury
instructions upon fraud and constructive fraud have not been preserved for appeal.

III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This matter relates to an investment company known as Dollars and Sense Growth Fund,
LP, a Delaware limited partnership, which specializes in investments relating to precious metals,
like gold and silver. R., p. 000026. The principal place of business for Dollars and Sense is in
Idaho. R., Ex., p. 001509. Dollars and Sense not only invests in and purchases precious metals,
but also takes possession and arranges for the storage of such precious metals in vaults
specifically designed for the same with all the requisite modem security features. R., p. 000027.
The precious metals are stored in facilities located in Idaho. R., p. 000053.
The investors are the limited partners of Dollars and Sense. R., p. 000053. Dollars and
Sense has one general partner, namely Profits Plus Capital Management, L.L.C., a Delaware
limited liability company. R., p. 000053. Robert Coleman resides in Idaho and is the sole
member and manager of Profits Plus. R., p. 000053. The general partner, Profits Plus, is only
entitled to receive from Dollars and Sense a management fee and some incentive fees. R., p.
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000053. All other profits, losses, and revenues generated by Dollars and Sense are distributed or
allocated solely to the limited partners based upon their investments. R., p. 000053.
Robert Coleman is a registered investment advisor and holds multiple securities licenses
which are regulated both by Securities and Exchange CommissionlFINRA and the Idaho
Department of Finance. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 440, 1. 23 - p. 446, 1. 20. These licenses allow Mr.
Coleman, through Profits Plus, to collect management and incentive fees for the management of
Dollars and Sense. Tr., Vol 2, p. 440, 1. 23 - p. 446, 1. 20.
Jeffrey Podesta is the sole member and manager of Street Search, LLC. R., p. 000037.
Jeffrey Podesta is a New Jersey resident and Street Search, LLC is a New Jersey limited liability
company. R., p. 000037. Jeffrey Podesta, both individually and through Street Search, LLC,
locates investors and raises capital for investment opportunities. R., p. 000110. At all times
material hereto, Jeffrey Podesta was an independent contractor for Schafer-Cullen Capital in
New York, New York where he solicits and markets investors. Tr., Vol. 2., p. 898, 11. 7-24; p.
903,11. 2-13; R., p. 000111. Jeffrey Podesta does not hold any current securities licenses and is
not a registered investment advisor. Tr. Vol. 2, p., 907, 11. 8-19.
In late 2008 and early 2009, Robert Coleman contacted Jeffrey Podesta to discuss
marketing Dollars and Sense. R., p. 000037; Tr., Vol. 2, p. 499, 1. 8 p. 502,1. 7. Jeffrey Podesta
was interested in the concept of the precious metals market and felt that he, with his experience
in raising capital, and Robert Coleman, with his knowledge of the precious metals market, would
make a great combination. Tr.,Vo1. 2, p. 908, 1. - 910, 1. 10. In late April or early May, 2009,
Robert Coleman and Jeffrey Podesta traveled to New York, New York, to meet with various
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individuals, including an attorney, to discuss the formation of a new entity, an open-ended
mutual fund consistent with the Limited Partnership, but not limited by the same securities
regulations. R., p. 000247-48; Tr., Vol. 2, p. 918, 1. 11- p. 919, p. 12; R., p., 000113-115, R., p.
000112-113; R., Ex., p. 000758-767, 000768-771. Following these meetings, the parties agreed
that the new fund idea was too expensive to pursue Tr., Vol. 2, p. 918, 1. 11- p. 919, 1. 12; R., p.
000114. From here, the parties disagree on the material terms of any alleged agreement and
whether an agreement was ever reached.
In order to market the services and benefits of Dollars and Sense, Profits Plus claimed
that no contract existed, or if a contract existed, it was an independent contractor consulting
agreement with Street Search and/or Jeffrey Podesta. R., p. 000027-28. To better enable Jeffrey
Podesta and Street Search to market Dollars and Sense, in August 2008, Robert Coleman added
Jeffrey Podesta as an Executive Officer of Dollars and Sense. R., Ex., p. 001545-1552; Tr., VoL
2, p. 551, L 13 - p. 552, 1. 7; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 806, 1. 16-p. 807, 1. 15. In addition, the name of
Dollars and Sense was amended to Street Search Dollars and Sense upon Mr. Podesta's claim
that it would better enable Street Search and Mr. Podesta to market Dollars and Sense. 3 Id.

Apart from the change in name, no substantive alterations were made to the Limited Partnership Agreement. R.,
Ex., p. 001507-28; cf. R., Ex., p. 000527-548; See also R., Ex., p. 000919. Pursuant to the Amended Limited
Partnership Agreement, the sole General Partner remained Profits Plus. !d., p. 1509. Further, the principal place of
business of the Partnership remained as 704 13 th Ave. South, Nampa, Idaho. Jd; See also R., Ex., p. 001454-1506
and 000629-681. At no time was Street Search, LLC or Jeffrey Podesta ever included as a member, manager, or
owner upon the documentation filed with the departments of finance, tax, corporate, or any regulatory authorities.
See R., Ex., p. 000549-000575 (LP Subscription documents for Dollars and Sense; Confidential Private Offering
Memorandum for Dollars and Sense dated November 1,2007); R., Ex., p. 000576-628 (Dollars and Sense Amended
and Restated Confidential Private Offering Memorandum); R., Ex., p. 000629-681 (Street Search Dollars and Sense
Growth Fund, LP, Confidential Private Offering Memorandum dated August 1, 2009); R., Ex., p. 000682-734
(Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP Confidential Private Offering Memorandum).
3
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Over the course of 2009, Dollars and Sense paid to Street Search varying amounts for
what Respondents believed to be advances for marketing services. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 591, 1. 21 - p.
593, 1. 17; p. 595, 1. 22-p. 598, 1. 17. Profits Plus issued an independent contractor 1099 tax form
to Street Search for the advances it paid. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 597, 1. 19-p. 598, 1. 10. Ultimately,
however, Street Search failed to identify or to bring-in a single investor to Dollars and Sense. Tr.,
Vol. 2, p. 821,1. 1- p. 823,1. 22. Instead, Profits Plus through Robert Coleman, generated one
very significant client, Philip Wrigley, who invested in the fund after he "read an article Robert
Coleman wrote on precious metals, investing in- in storage." R., Ex., 001059, 11. 13-22; p. 1062,
1. 21 - p. 1064,1. 7; p. 1066,1. 17- p. 1069,1. 8.
On March 5, 2010, Jeffrey Podesta's attorney contacted Robert Coleman to assert an
ownership interest in the Limited Partnership. R., p. 000038.

Jeffrey Podesta further averred

that the agreement between the parties was not a consulting agreement, but, rather, in exchange
for Mr. Podesta's services, Street Search, LLC, was promised a 50% ownership interest in the
limited partnership, Dollars and Sense. R., p. 000037.
On July 22, 2010, Respondents filed their Verified Complaint for declaratory judgment.
R., p. 000025-30.

Following entry of an Order Allowing Default, on October 12, 2010,

Appellants filed a Motion to Dismiss asserting a lack of personal jurisdiction. R., p. 000033-35,
R., p. 000036-43. On December 17, 2010, the trial court entered its Memorandum Opinion and
Order re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, denying Appellants' motion. R., p. 000070-78.
On February 22, 2011, Appellants filed their Answer to Complaint, Counterclaims and
Demand for Jury Trial. R., p. 000079-100. Therein, Appellants assert a claim of ownership in
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Dollars and Sense. R., p. 000084-93. Appellants further aver that Mr. Podesta traveled to Idaho
during 2009 in the furtherance of that claim. R., p. 000081; R., p. 000087.

Appellants were

permitted to amend their Counterclaim to assert additional claims against Respondents but were
denied in their request to amend the Counterclaim to assert a claim for punitive damages. R., p.
000318-320.

The majority of Appellants'

counterclaims were dismissed pursuant to

Respondents' motions for summary judgment. R., p. 000264-267; R., p. 000339-341; Hr'g July
7, 2011, Hr'g Tr., p. 43, l. 11 - p. 65, l. 23. Individual claims asserted by Appellant Jeffrey
Podesta were dismissed prior to trial. Id.
The case therefore went to trial upon Appellant Street Search's claim that it had a
contract with Profits Plus for 50% ownership in Dollars and Sense. In addition, Street Search
claimed that it believed it had a contract for 50% ownership in Dollars and Sense and, if it did
not, Street Search and Coleman committed acts of fraud or constructive fraud. In addition, Street
Search asserted a claim for breach of fiduciary duty based upon the existence of the contract it
alleged existed between the parties. R., p. 000295-317. Street Search did not request a jury
instruction upon its fraud and constructive fraud claims and did not object to the lack thereof.
On February 17,2012, the jury unanimously decreed that Street Search had failed to establish the
existence of a contract between the parties. R.,p. 000697-700.
Following entry of the jury verdict, Respondents timely moved for an award of attorney
fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. R., P
000797-807. Contrary to Appellants claim that the trial court denied "Coleman's attorney fees
request in its entirety" the majority of Respondents' claimed attorney fees were granted.
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Appellants' Brief, p. 12; R., p 000797-807. Appellants do not appeal the award ofattomey fees.
Appellants' post-trial motion to dismiss Jeffrey Podesta, as well as Appellants' motions for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial, were all denied. R., p. 000738-740, Tr.,
Vol. 1, p. 273-301; R., p.000787-796; Tr. Vol. 1,305-336; Hr'g Oct. 11,2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 73110.

IV. RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether there was personal jurisdiction over Jeffrey Podesta in Idaho
2. Whether there was personal jurisdiction over Street Search, LLC in Idaho
3. Whether the Trial Court erred when it entered declaratory judgments on Counts 1,2, and
3 of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint*
4. Whether there was good cause to exclude Defendants/Counterclaimants' expert witnesses
or did Plaintiffs Counsel's comments affect the substantial rights of the
Defendants/Counterclaimants *
5. Whether there were evidentiary errors at trial that denied Jeffrey Podesta and Street
Search a fair trial
6. Whether the verdict was in accord with the clear weight of the evidence*
7. Whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict*
8. Whether the Appellants are entitled to atty fees on appeal
9. Whether court erred when it denied Appellants' motion for new trial according to 60(b)
R., p. 000823-827;R., p. 001205.
Issues denoted by an asterisk were not briefed by Appellants. Pursuant to their briefing,
Appellants now assert the following additional issues upon appeal:
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1. Trial Court committed plain error when it dismissed Appellants fraud and constructive
fraud claims;
2. Trial Court erred when it refused to instruct the Jury regarding promissory estoppel
Appellants' Brief, p. 2.

V.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

1. Respondents are entitled to their costs and attorney fees on appeal.
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I.

VI.
ARGUMENT
The Trial Court Properly Denied Appellants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Personal Jurisdiction.
A. Standard of Review.

"The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is
one of law, which this Court reviews freely." Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho 148, 150, 124 P.3d
1024,1026 (2005) (citing McAnally v. Bonjac, Inc., 137 Idaho 488, 491, 50 P.3d 983, 986 (2002)
(citations omitted)). "When reviewing a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction,
this Court applies the same standard as when we review appeals from orders of summary
judgment; we construe the evidence presented to the district court in favor of the party opposing
the order and accord that party the benefit of all inferences which might be reasonably drawn."
!d. (citing Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74-75, 803 P.2d 978, 980-81

(1990) (citing Intermountain Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Shepard Bus. Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 540,
531 P.2d 1183,1185 (1975)). Thus in reviewing the district court's denial of Appellants' motion
to dismiss, the Court construes the evidence in favor of Respondents. See Id.
B. Appellants fall within Idaho's long-arm statute, Idaho Code § 5-514.

"For an Idaho court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, two
criteria must be met; the act giving rise to the cause of action must fall within the scope of our
long-arm statute and the constitutional standards of due process must be met." McAnally, 137
Idaho at 491, 50 P.3d at 986 (citing St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. State of Washington, 123
Idaho 739, 742, 852 P.2d 491, 494 (1993) (citations omitted)).
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Here, the district court held, not once, but twice, that its exercise of personal jurisdiction
over Appellants, Jeffrey Podesta and Street Search, LLC was proper under Idaho's long-arm
statute, Idaho Code § 5-514, which provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over claims arising
out of a defendant's contacts with Idaho. R., p. 000070-78, Tr. Vol. 1., p. 285, 1. 6-9. Western

States Equip. Co., v. American Amex, Inc., 125 Idaho 155, 158,868 P.2d 483,486 (1994). Idaho
Code § 5-514, provides, in pertinent part:
Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, whether or
not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or through an
agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits
said person, firm, company, association or corporation, and if an
individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing
of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this state which is
hereby defined as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing
pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish,
transact or enhance the business purpose or objective or any part
thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation;
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate
within this state;

I.C. § 5-514. "The long-arm statute should be liberally construed." Knutsen v. Cloud, 142 Idaho
148,151,124 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2005) (citingPurco Fleet Servs., Inc., v. Dept. of Fin., 140 Idaho
121,123,90 P.3d 346, 348 (2004) (citations omitted). "Moreover, Idaho's long-arm statute is coextensive with all of the jurisdiction available to this state under the due process clause of the
United States Constitution." !d. (citing Houghland Farms, Inc., 119 Idaho at 75, 803 P.2d at
981).
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On December 17, 2010, the trial court entered its first Memorandum Decision and Order
re: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. R., p. 000070-78. Therein, the trial court made the following
factual findings:
1.
[Appellants] have asserted an ownership interest worth
upwards of $1 ,000,000 in Dollars and Sense or Profits Plus.
2.
Profits Plus and Coleman have filed an action in Idaho
seeking a declaratory judgment that Podesta and Street Search
have no ownership interest in Dollars and Sense or Profits Plus.
3.
[Appellant], Jeffrey Podesta, visited Idaho on at least one
occasion to view facilities that would be used to store precious
metals owned by a the business entity at issue. He worked on
marketing presentations for potential investors and contacted
potential investors.
R., p. 000071-72; R., p. 000037. These findings are consistent with the Affidavit of Jeffrey
Podesta wherein Mr. Podesta claimed that his company, Street Search, LLC was a 50% owner in
the fund; that he personally agreed to act as President and CEO of the fund; that he traveled to
Idaho in 2009 as the President and CEO of the fund, to meet with Robert Coleman and to see the
storage facility where the fund stored precious metals purchased by its limited partners. R., p.
000037-38.
Appellants do not appear to challenge the trial court's factual findings other than to state
that "Respondents failed to prove that Appellants were conducting business in Idaho."
Appellants' Brief, p. 14.

First, as noted above, the trial court was constrained to view all

inferences in favor of Respondents. Next, as noted by the district court, there were ample facts
supporting its decision that Appellants' activities fell within the ambit of Idaho Code § 5-514.
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Appellants were claiming a significant pecuniary interest in a limited partnership, the principal
place of business for which was Idaho. See R., Ex., p. 001507-28, R., Ex., p. 000527-548; R.,
Ex., p. 000549-000575; R., Ex., p. 000576-628; R., Ex., p. 000629-681; R., Ex., p. 000682-734;
R., Ex., p. 001454-1506 and 000629-681. 4 This pecuniary interest was not limited to the time
Jeffrey Podesta traveled to Idaho, but based upon Appellants' own claims, "had the relationship
continued, and if, as alleged, Podesta is indeed a 50% owner of Dollars and Sense, he would, and
will, of necessity have ongoing contact with Idaho. " R., p. 000076. As noted by the trial court,
"If he [Jeffrey Podesta] was to be President and CEO of the fund, he is certainly purposefully
availing himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum where the only tangible
assets and activities of the fund are located." R., p. 000076.
Moreover, the present claim that "neither Podesta nor Street Search was in any manner
conducting business with the LP by asserting an ownership interest in the fund" is unsupported
by any fact or law. Appellants' Brief, p. 16. Appellants admittedly traveled to Idaho "for the
purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or
enhance the business purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company,
association or corporation": Street Search, LLC, in the furtherance of a claim of ownership in the
LP; and, Jeffrey Podesta in the furtherance of his claim that he was the President and CEO of the

4 Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP filed its Amendment to Certificate of Registration of Limited Partnership with
the State ofldaho on December 13,2010. It is undisputed that Dollars and Sense Growth Fund, LP, was properly
registered with the Idaho Secretary of State prior to the date Appellants filing their Answer to Complaint,
Counterclaims and Demand for Jury Trial on February 22, 2011. Appellants filed their second Motion to Dismiss
Jeffrey Podesta on March 5,2012. Again, the claim that that LP was no properly registered in Idaho as of2009 was
not raised or supported. See R., p. 0000712.
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LP. See

I.e.

§ 5-514. The trial court properly determined that Appellants' activities fell within

Idaho's long-arm statute.
Appellants filed a second motion to dismiss only as to Jeffrey Podesta, an individual,
following the trial of this matter. At that time, Appellants specifically stated that they were "not
asking to dismiss Street Search." Tr, Vol 1, p. 275, 1. 16. 5 In denying Appellants' (second)
motion to dismiss Jeffrey Podesta, the trial court held:
Mr. Podesta was out here not just on behalf of Street Search; he
was out here on his own hook. He was claimed to be an executive
officer of this company. You're correct that it was not an Idahoformed company, that it was -- or an LLC, whatever it was. It was
in Delaware. But the fact of the matter was that this is -- the
operations were here, the physical assets were here, the actions
taking place here. For the very reasons I held in the first place, I
think the court had jurisdiction. ... I still find that jurisdiction
existed because he was here and he was making those claims based
on his conduct in Idaho. He lost them, but he had activities,
business activities, within the state of Idaho, and he had claims,
tort claims, that he was pursuing within the state of Idaho " .his
conduct overall was on his own behalf; not just on behalf of Street
Search. So the motion will be denied.
Tr. Vol. 1., p. 285, 1. 6-9. The factual record upon which the Court relied in finding that Jeffrey
Podesta's activities fell within Idaho's long-arm statute were compelling: Mr. Podesta testified:
And I had to make sure, as the president of the fund, that when I
got out of there, there was a storage situation and that there was the
ability to handle money, handle the stuff. And if we were going to
go to other prospects, if we were going to go to other situations, we
needed to be sure and I had to be convinced that we had the proper
storage facility. So, with Mr. Wrigley being, in my estimation, a
5 Having filed a Counterclaim and taken the position, after trial, that jurisdiction was proper over Street Search,
LLC, it seems rather axiomatic that Appellants now seek to take the position that jurisdiction was not proper as to
Street Search, LLC.
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very good possible client, it was critical - if we wanted to add
money to his existing account, we had to make sure that our
product was tight, it was in good shape, and could move forward.
So that was the reason I started to go to, actually, the Idaho
location first and then to make sure things were in order and then
to come to Arizona so that I could, in good conscience, meet with
Mr. Wrigley.
Bob could make the presentation and the
representation that Street Search Dollar and Sense Fund could
move forward, handle critical size. And that was really what was
gomg on.
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 941,1. 11 - p. 942, 1. 8. During Appellants' visit to Idaho, Mr. Podesta viewed the
vault where the precious metals purchased by the LP were stored "to make sure that the vaulting
capability could sustain a lot of growth"; he visited with Corky Gowans regarding current and
future storage possibilities in Idaho; and, met with Nick Barber with Idaho Bank Corp.,
regarding potential financing for a new vault storage facility.6 Tr. Vol. 2, p. 959, 1. 2 - p. 962,1.
10. The trial judge correctly determined, twice, that Idaho's long-arm statute was applicable to
Appellants' actions.
C. The trial court correctly concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction did
not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In denying Appellants' motions to dismiss, the trial court further found that the exercise
of jurisdiction over both Appellants arose out of Appellants' contacts with Idaho, that it did not
violate the Due Process Clause, that Appellants had sufficient minimum contacts with Idaho, and

"Now the Garda Vault, as I understand it, was where the Street Search Dollar
and Sense Fund kept its - stored its investments; is that correct? A. Right. Q. And
you were also looking for vault space; is that correct, as well? A. That's correct."
Tr., Vol. 2, p. P. 961, 1. 21 - p. 962, 1. 3.
6
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that Appellants had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in
Idaho. R., p. 000074-77.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits a
state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
when that defendant has certain minimum contacts with the state
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316,66 S.Ct. 154, 158,90 L.Ed. 95,
101-02 (1945). In determining the existence of minimum contacts,
a court must focus on the relationship among the defendant, the
forum, and the litigation. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,204,97
S.Ct. 2569,2579-80,53 L.Ed.2d 683, 697-98 (1977). Once a court
finds the requisite minimum contacts, it must then proceed to
determine whether its assertion of personal jurisdiction comports
with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,476, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2184,
85 L.Ed.2d 528, 543 (1985).

Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 727, 152 P.3d 594, 598 (2007). Here, the
trial court properly analyzed each of the foregoing factors:
The underlying dispute in this case is the terms and conditions of a
contract for consulting services. Specifically, at issue is whether
Plaintiff Coleman agreed to transfer 50% ownership interest in
Dollars and Sense to Podesta in exchange for Podesta's marketing
services. The negotiations underlying the parties' contract were
apparently done entirely without either individual leaving his
respective state. The contract concerns a company located in
Idaho. The only physical activity of the dispute company is storage
of precious metals. That activity is carried out in Idaho. Podesta's
one trip to Idaho was in furtherance of that activity. His visit, it can
be inferred, was to better enable him to market the fund. Given his
involvement with prospective purchase of real estate by the fund, I
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also infer his involvement in management during the brief duration
of the business relationship, went beyond simply marketing.
Had the relationship continued, and if, as alleged, Podesta IS
indeed a 50% owner of Dollars and Sense, he would, and will, of
necessity have ongoing contact with Idaho. If he was to be
President and CEO of the fund, he is certainly purposefully
availing himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
form where the only tangible assets and activities of the fund are
located.
R., p. 000076. The trial court thus concluded that "the claim [by Podesta and Street Search]
arises from the claimed ownership of the Idaho based company/partnership. It arises directly
from the defendants' forum based activities." R., p. 000077; Houghland Farms, Inc., v. Johnson,
119 Idaho 72, 75, 803 P.2d 978, 981 (1990). Further, that, "[w]here Appellant Street Search,
LLC] claims ownership of an Idaho business and [Appellant Jeffrey Podesta] claims entitlement

to the office of President and CEO of that business, it is hardly unfair to require him to defend a
suit over that ownership and title in Idaho." R., p. 000077; Houghland, 119 Idaho at 75-76, 803
P .2d at 981-982.

The trial court correctly determined that these facts established ample

minimum contacts with Idaho.
The due process analysis is a two-step process. Once a court
determines that the requisite minimum contacts with the forum
state exist, the court must then consider the contacts in light of
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal
jurisdiction would comport with "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 315,66 S.Ct. 154, 158,90 L.Ed. 95,102 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed.
278, 283 (1940». See Houghland Farms, 119 Idaho at 76, 803
P.2d at 982. This analysis permits the court to consider:
[1] "the burden on the defendant,"
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[2] "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute,"
[3] "the plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief,"
[4] "the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies," and
[5] the "shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies."

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477, 105 S.Ct. at 2184,85 L.Ed.2d at 543
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S.Ct. at
564, 62 L.Ed.2d at 498). See Houghland Farms, 119 Idaho at 76,
803 P.2d at 982.
Western States, 125 Idaho at 158-159,868 P.2d at 486-487.
Apart from arguing a strained and inaccurate interpretation of the factual record,
Appellants do not appear to disagree with the trial court's factual findings and instead suggest
only that "asserting jurisdiction under these facts violates due process." Appellants' Brief, p. 19.
In substantive part, Appellants contend that due process was violated because it was unfair to
make Appellants' travel to Idaho to defend this case (as opposed to Delaware - where
incidentally, Appellants would also have to travel to defend the case and where neither party ever
actually traveled - thus making Appellants' claim that Delaware is more appropriate than Idaho
more than dubious); that there is no interest for Idaho in this matter (despite the fact that the
principal place of business for the LP is in Idaho, that Robert Coleman is an Idaho resident and
Profits Plus is an Idaho limited liability company, that all assets of the LP are here in Idaho, and
that the LP is regulated by the Idaho Department of Finance); and that Respondents "should not
be inconvenienced" by litigating this case on the East Coast as the LP is a Delaware partnership
(Appellants themselves had no contact with Delaware thus rendering the argument that Delaware

19

was a more appropriate forum nonsensical); and finally, that the most efficient resolution of the
parties' disputes involved residences or entities related to states on the east coast would appear to
be on the east coast (except that this case does not involve a dispute over any "residences," only
three entities, two of which are principally based in Idaho.) Appellants' Brief, p. 18-19.
As noted by the trial court, "the claim [by Podesta and Street Search] arises from the
claimed ownership of the Idaho based company/partnership. It arises directly from the
defendants' forum based activities." R., p. 000077. Further, that, "[w]here [Appellant Street
Search, LLC] claims ownership of an Idaho business and [Appellant Jeffrey Podesta] claims
entitlement to the office of President and CEO of that business, it is hardly unfair to require him
to defend a suit over that ownership and title in Idaho." R., p. 000077. The trial court's findings
are consistent with the evidentiary record and Idaho law. The trial court therefore properly
denied Appellants' motion to dismiss - both of them.
D. Appellants waived their right to contest personal jurisdiction when they filed their
Counterclaims.
Rule 4(i)(2), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to defend an action without
constituting a voluntary appearance. LR.C.P. 4(i)(2). It may not, however, permit the filing of an
affirmative counterclaim without constituting a voluntary appearance. Here, Appellants sought
to invoke the jurisdiction of this court in order to pursue affirmative claims for relief against
Respondents. 7 See e.g., Grange Ins. Assoc., v. State, 110 Wash.2d 752,757 P.2d 933 (1988).

7 The Court: "You're getting two bites of the apple, 'Gee Whiz, I can go ahead and try it, and ifI lose it, I could still
go back to New Jersey and try it again. But if I win it, I can go ahead and claim the fruits of my victory in Idaho."
Tr., Vol. 1, p. 281, I. 17-25.
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II.

Trial Court Acted Within the Bounds of its Discretion in Denying
Appellants' Motion for a New Trial
A. Standard of Review
A trial court's decision whether to grant relief pursuant to LR.C.P.
60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The decision will be
upheld if it appears that the trial court (1) correctly perceived the
issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards, and
(3) reached its determination through an exercise of reason.
A determination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of
fact to be determined by the trial court. Those factual findings will
be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. If the trial court
applies the facts in a logical manner to the criteria set forth in Rule
60(b), while keeping in mind the policy favoring relief in doubtful
cases, the court will be deemed to have acted within its discretion.
[Waller v. State, Department of Health and Welfare] 146 Idaho
234, 237-38, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061-62 (2008) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) .... Although courts have broad
discretion in granting or denying such motions, that discretion is
bounded by the requirement that the party seeking relief
demonstrate "unique and compelling circumstances" which justify
relief. [Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611
(1996).]
It is incumbent upon a party seeking relief from a judgment not
only to meet the requirements of LR.C.P. 60(b), but also to show,
plead or present evidence of facts which, if established, would
constitute a meritorious defense to the action. This policy
recognizes that it would be an idle exercise and a waste of judicial
resources for a court to set aside a judgment if, in fact, there is no
genuine justiciable controversy. Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v.
Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 317, 870 P.2d 663,670 (Ct.App.1994).

Maynard v. Nguyen, 152 Idaho 724, 274 P.3d 589, 591 (2011.)
In so far as a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b )(3) is made, "[o]ur Supreme Court
has stated that 'fraud,' for the purposes of this rule, requires more than interparty misconduct-it
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will be found only in the presence of such "tampering with the administration of justice as to
suggest 'a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.' " Artiach
Trucking, Inc. v. Wolters, 118 Idaho 656, 658, 798 P.2d 938, 940 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting
Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 334, 612 P.2d 1175, 1181 (1980); See also Win ofMich.,
Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 754, 53 P.3d 330, 337 (2002) (upholding district
court's determination that "there had been no material misrepresentation of the corporation's
worth" which finding was supported by the evidence and was therefore not clearly erroneous.);
See also Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 709, 117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) (holding insufficient the
argument that plaintiff had committed fraud by making false statements in affidavits because
"[n]one of the statements, even if false, constitute such tampering with the administration of
justice as to suggest a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public."
Id.).

As regards a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), "although the court is vested with
broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion is
limited and [the motion] may be granted only on a showing of 'unique and compelling
circumstances' justifying relief." Dawson

v.

Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380, 234

P.3d 699, 704 (2010) (citing Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349, 924 P.2d 607, 611 (1996)
(quoting In re Estate of Bagley, 117 Idaho 1091, 1093,793 P.2d 1263,1265 (Ct.App.1990)).
Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the moving party to "demonstrate unique and compelling
circumstances justifying relief." Maynard, 152 Idaho 724, 274 P.3d at 592. Moreover, as noted
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above, the moving party "must allege facts which, if proven true, would constitute a meritorious
defense."!d. As noted by the Court in Maynard,
A detennination under Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of
facts to be detennined by the trial court. Those factual findings will
be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. "If the trial court
applies the facts in a logical manner to the criteria set forth in a
logical manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 60(b), while keeping
in mind the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases, the court will
be deemed to have acted within its discretion."

Id., 274 P.3d at 596 (citing Dawson, 149 Idaho at 380, 234 P.3d at 704 (quoting Waller, 146
Idaho at 237-38, 192 P.3d at 1061-62)). Furthennore, that "where a district court grants relief
that is inconsistent with the pleadings and evidence in the case, such fact "may constitute unique
and compelling circumstances sufficient to justify relief under LR.C.P. 60(b)(6).' " Id. (quoting

Dawson, 149 Idaho at 380,234 P.3d at 704
B. The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in denying Appellants'
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6), Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Following entry of the jury verdict in favor of Respondents, Appellants filed two motions
for a new trial. R., p. 000701-704; R., p. 000828. The trial court entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order denying Appellants first motion for a new trial and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on June 8, 2012. R., p. 000787-796. Appellants now challenge the
trial court's denial of its second motion for a new trial, made pursuant to Rules 60(b)(3) and (6),
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, filed August 14, 2012. Appellants' Brief, p. 19; R., p. 00082883l. This second motion came on for hearing on October 1, 2012, was denied by oral order of
the trial court on October 25,2012, and by written order of the trial court on November 6,2012.
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R., p. 001201-3; Hr'g October 1, 2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 73-103; Hr'g October 25,2012, Hr'g Tr., p.
104-110.
Appellants spend considerable time in their brief to re-argue their characterization of the
evidence. Appellants Brief, p. 19-25.

These same arguments were considered and properly

rejected by the trial court. Hr'g October 1, 2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 73-103; Hr'g October 25, 2012,
Hr' g Tr., p. 104-110.

The trial court considered Appellants' arguments, recognized that it

perceived the issue as discretionary, and acted within the bounds of its discretion when it
concluded that the issue was more properly framed as a discovery dispute which could and
should have been asserted prior to the trial. Hr' g October 25, 2012, Hr' g Tr., p. 104-110. In
particular, the court criticized the broad nature of the discovery request at issue by Appellants'
motion and noted that, had the issue been raised prior to the trial, there was an argument to be
made both ways: both for an order compelling Respondents to respond, but also an argument that
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the information complained of was beyond the scope of the written request. 8 Jd., at p. 106-107.
Either way, the trial court determined that the dispute could and should have been raised prior to
trial if Appellants truly believed that the information was responsive to their request:
"it's not the kind of request I would order sanctions for failing to
produce it. I don't think it's that clear. And on top of that, aside
from the fact no one came to me at the time and asked me to do it,
what happened - and, again, that's the problem sometimes with
overly broad discovery requests ... Nobody squawked. Nobody
followed up and said, wait a minute, I asked for all
correspondence. I didn't ask for the FINRA report. Fine. Give me
the FINRA report, but I want all correspondence with the
Department of Finance. It doesn't - the interrogatory phrased
doesn't say all correspondence within the Department of Finance,
it just says all correspondence related [to the issuance
revocation and/or suspension of any such licenses, and the
reinstatement, if applicable] ... "
Hr'g October 25,2012, Hr'g Tr., p. 107,11.5-24.
The trial court did expressly or impliedly not condone or promote discovery abuses.
Appellants Brief, p., 26-27. The trial court simply found that there were none. Tr., Vol. 1, p. 1048 By its Motion for a New Trial, Appellants contend that Respondents' response to Request for Production No. 27
was inaccurate and was fraudulent. In order to make this argument, Appellants strain the literal language of the
request for production which stated, in its entirety, "Please provide each and every document relating to the issuance
of any professional, broker, and/or securities licenses to Robert Coleman or Profits Plus, the revocation and/or
suspension of any such licenses, and the reinstatement, if applicable, if any such licenses." R., p. 000840. In
response, Respondents produced documents obtained from FINRA which contained the dates of issuance,
revocation, or expiration of Plaintiffs' licenses, any complaints or disciplinary history, and the current status thereof
R., p. 001014-1152. Marilyn Chastain with the Idaho Department of Finance stated "[i]t is my understanding that,
to the extent a registered investment advisor has reportable disciplinary history, the same would be included in a
FINRA BrokerCheck Report, which is available to the general public upon a public records request. Additional
details on disciplinary actions, not generally available to the public, are available pursuant to a FINRA Snapshot
report regularly generated and maintained by FINRA as the national clearinghouse on disciplinary issues relating to
licenses of various licenses issued related to securities and investment advice." R., p. 001155,,5. Here, the FINRA
Snapshot report was produced to Appellants. In response to a nearly identical request for production to Appellants,
Appellants interpreted the request to include only the Broker Check report generally available to the public. R., p.
00 I 016, '5, p. 1136-1152. Incidentally, Jeffrey Podesta's Broker Check report did disclose disciplinary history. R.,
p. 1142-1151. Consequently, it seems more than disingenuous for Appellants to now argue that the discovery
request at issue encompassed documents which Appellants themselves saw no reason to produce or to compel the
production of
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110.

Respondents believed that they had provided all information required by Appellants,

especially given the fact that Appellants had actually provided less information in response to a
nearly identical request for production. R., p. 001015-16.

When asked to provide

correspondence to or from the Idaho Department of Finance, Kurt Merritt, it is undisputed that
Respondents fully complied. R., p. 1097-1135.

9

Consequently, the claim that Respondents

intentionally withheld relevant evidence is patently without factual support. The trial court acted
within the bounds of its discretion when it denied Appellants' motion' for a new trial upon this
basis.
Moreover, the remainder of Appellants' argument in this respect assume acts of
intentional discovery abuse which Appellants simply cannot support. There remains no proof
that Mr. Coleman was anything other than honest and accurate when he stated "I don't have any
client complaints on my record. I have a very clean and honest record." Tr., Vol. 2, p. 456, II. 26. Similarly, the statement that Mr. Coleman has never had a "regulatory authority in any way
sanction [him], fine [him], suspend [him] in anything" remains undisputedly accurate. Tr., Vol.
2, p. 876, 11. 8-17; R., p. 001155,

~

5, R., p. 001053-56 (Snapshot disciplinary history).

Similarly, Appellants' reliance upon State ex reI. Symms v. V-J Oil Co., 94 Idaho 456,
490 P.2d 323 (1971) for the proposition that once fraud is established, the damages are
presumed, is inapposite. The undisputed record before this Court establishes that Appellants

See also R., p. 00 I 0 16, ~4, p. 1068 (Please produce a copy of all documents which reflect communications,
including but not limited to, correspondence, e-mails, letters, and or telephone records, between any of the Plaintiffs
and Kurt Merritt (an Idaho Department of Finance employee). Respondents fully complied with this request R., p.
1097-1135. The separate request for correspondence with one individual employed by the Idaho Department of
Finance renders Appellants' current reading of Request for Production No. 27 untenable.
9
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lack any proof of fraud or an intentional false statement. Consequently, and upon this basis, the
trial court was well-within the bounds of its discretion in denying Appellants' motion for a new
trial upon this basis pursuant to Rule 60(b )(3) which requires that Appellants establish "fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct." LR.C.P. 60(b)(3). The trial court found that Appellants
failed to sustain this burden.

Appellants do not now present even a marginally persuasive

argument for a finding otherwise.
Similarly, Appellants cannot support their argument for a new trial pursuant to Rule
60(b)( 6), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and again, the trial court acted consistent with the
bounds of its limited discretion in denying the motion for a new trial upon this basis. Dawson,
149 Idaho at 380, 234 P.3d at 704. Rule 60(b)(6) permits the trial court to grant a new trial only
on a showing of 'unique and compelling circumstances' justifying relief." Id. (citations omitted).
In support of its argument for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), apart from acknowledging the

"unique and compelling circumstance" standard, Appellants merely restate their argument with
respect to their motion pursuant to Rule 60(b )(3). Appellants Brief, p. 30; See City of Meridian,
154 Idaho 425,299 P.3d at 257 (The Court "will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not
supported by propositions of law, authority or argument." (citing Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho
53,60,244 P.3d 197,204 (2010)). For the same reasons that Appellants are not entitled to relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b )(3), Appellants cannot sustain their burden pursuant to Rule 60(b)( 6).
Appellants' motion to dismiss was thus correctly denied.

27

III.

The Trial Court Acted Within the Bounds of Discretion in Excluding
Evidence of Settlement Negotiations.

A. Standard of Review

The Court reviews a trial court's decision admitting or excluding evidence under the
abuse of discretion standard. White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356, 362 (2004)
(citing Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 45 P.3d 810 (2002) (citations omitted)). "The test for
determining whether the district court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court correctly
perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Id.,
(citing Sun Valley Shopping Center Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993,
1000 (1991).
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting Respondents' motion in limine
regarding the admissibility of an exhibit. "Trial courts have broad discretion when ruling on a
motion in limine." Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16,25, 105 P.3d 676, 685 (2005)
(citing Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 767, 86 P.3d
475, 481 (2004)). "This Court reviews the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion in
limine under an abuse of discretion standard." !d. (citations omitted).
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B. Idaho Rule of Evidence was correctly applied by the trial court in ruling upon
Respondents' motion in limine.
Prior to trial, the trial court granted Respondents' motion in limine regarding settlement
negotiations, and in particular, a document Appellants now label as "Exhibit E." Tr., Vol. 1., p.
161,1. 22 - p. 170,1. 18. 10
Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 408:
Evidence of (1) furnishing, offering, or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting, offering, or promlsmg to accept, a valuable
consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not
admissible to prove liability for, invalidity of, or amount of the
claim or any other claim. Evidence of conduct or statements made
in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible.
I.R.E. 408. "Deciding whether a settlement agreement should be disclosed to a jury rests in the
broad discretion of the trial court." Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'[ Med. Ctr., 134 Idaho 46,57,995
P.2d 816,827 (2000) (citing Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 335, 848 P.2d 387,393 (1992)).
In addition, I.R.E. 403 protects against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, if it
tends to suggest a decision on an improper basis. State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 873 P .2d 905
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935, 115 S. Ct. 332, 130 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1994). This rule
creates a balancing test. Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107,753 P.2d 1253 (1987). The trial
judge must first measure the probative worth of the proposed evidence by focusing upon the
degree of its relevance and materiality while considering the need for it on the issue on which it

10 Appellants' Exhibit "E" does not appear in the record as such because Appellants never offered it as an exhibit.
R., Exhibits 000001-3. Rather, the exhibit Appellants now claim was improperly excluded as Exhibit "E" appears
only as a portion of an exhibit to an Affidavit of Kim Gourley, filed January 5, 2012. R., p. 000515 and is not
marked with the "Exhibit E" sticker filed as an exhibit to Appellants' Brief.
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is to be introduced. Id. The trial judge must then consider whether the evidence amounts to
unfair prejudice. Id.
C. The trial court properly excluded evidence of settlement negotiations.
Appellants did not offer to attempt to offer "Exhibit E" during the trial of this matter.
Exhibit List, 000001-3. 11 Notwithstanding, the offending document was excluded pursuant to
the trial court's decision on Respondents' motion in limine. Tr., Vol. 1., p. 161, 1. 22 - p. 170, 1.
18. The trial court, in grating Respondents' motion in limine pursuant to Rule 408, excluded
only a discrete portion of the documents Respondents included in their motion. R., p. 00478-479,
~5

and R., p. 000512-523. In particular, and pertinent to this appeal, the trial court excluded a

proposed settlement agreement, signed by Robert Coleman, Profits Plus, and rejected by Jeffrey
Podesta, Street Search. R., p. 000515, Tr., Vol. l., p. 169,1.. 2-15. The trial court, acting within
its discretion, held:
... Up through the e-mail of March 2nd at 6:23 p.m., from Podesta
to Coleman, the call-me-in-the-moming e-mail, I don't see that as
II In discussing the admissibility of Exhibit l::L Appellants' "Exhibit E" was raised and addressed as follows:
Mr. Clark: It's our Exhibit E, Your Honor.
The Court: Your Exhibit E?
Mr. Clark. E as in Eric. This is what we contended was the offer and compromise, or the settlement, post settlement.
The Court: Looks an awful lot like an offer to compromise a disputed matter to me, Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark: With regard to E, Your Honor?
The Court: Yeah.
Mr. Clark: Yeah, I'm not arguing E is notThe Court: Well, E is part and parcel of the e-mail of March 2 - March 3 at 2:59 a.m.
Mr. Clark. Well, I'm not - I don'tThe Court: I thought you were offering that.
Mr. Clark: No, sir, I'm offering H. Yes, I am, I guess is what I'm saying. But ifrefers to he's not saying anything
more than he did in the first - the very first e-mail other than he's attached a
The Court: He's attached an agreement of settlement. It says, "To continue working with you, we need an
agreement. Here is the agreement." And in that context, that is an offer to settle, would be my ruling.
Mr. Clark: Okay.
Tr., Vol. 2, p. 735, I. 3-p. 736, I. 4.
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settlement negotlatIOns.
It is a graphic example of the
commencement of a dispute that was not apparent to anyone ...
this tells us when the dispute started. What follows from that
appears to be discussions of how we are going to resolve this
dispute .... As I read the record at this point, this offer of, "Here is
a new contract, sign it," is just that. It's an offer that's rejected
"
and it's --- therefore would not be admissible.
Tr., Vol. 1, p. 168,1. II-p. 169,1. 4.
Appellants contend that the document that the court determined to be an inadmissible
offer of settlement was merely "an offer to modify an existing contract" and "LR.E. 408 should
apply only where the parties are concluding their relationships and terminating their respective
claims." Appellants Brief, p. 32, 33. Appellants provide no authority to support this issue and
therefore, the Court need not consider it. City of Meridian, 154 Idaho 425,299 P.3d at 257. "We
will not consider issues cited on appeal that are not supported by propositions of law, authority
or argument." Id. (quoting Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 60, 244 P.3d 197, 204 (2010)).
Similarly, Appellants' assertion that "Coleman offered no valuable consideration" is not
supported by any citation to the record or to authority. Again, the Court need not consider an
argument not supported by cogent argument or authority. City of Meridian, 154 Idaho 425, 299
P.3d at 257 (citations omitted). Appellants' characterization of the evidence is of no assistance
to this Court in determining whether the trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in
concluding that Respondents offer to settle a disputed claim was properly admissible pursuant to
Rule 408.
Finally, Appellants' overstate the prejudicial effect of the exclusion of the document
Respondents now label as Exhibit E. Appellants were permitted to introduce Exhibits F, G, and
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H, all of which were sent near or contemporaneous to "Exhibit E" and contained similar, if not
duplicative statements. 12 The settlement agreement that Appellants now decree was so critical to
their case, the exclusion of which deprived them of a fair trial, offered little, if anything, that was
not presented to and rejected by the jury. See R., Ex., p. 001530-1533; Tr., Vol. 2, p. 719,1. 23p. 732, 1. 6. Appellants' claim that, as a result of the exclusion of Exhibit E and a portion of
Exhibit H "Coleman was allowed to lie to the Jury about the true nature of the contractual
relationship" is unsupported and is patently false. Appellants' Brief, p. 36. The parties presented
differing interpretations of the nature and scope of the parties' agreement - Appellants were
entitled to present their theory of the case and to cross-examine Respondents on theirs. See e.g.,
Tr., Vol 2, p. 718,1. 21- p. 755, 1. 7. The jury ultimately rejected Appellants' theory ofthe case.
Appellants' claim that the exclusion of a single piece of evidence deprived Appellants of a fair
trial is, in a word, meritless.
To the extent Appellants now challenge the redaction of Exhibit H, Appellants do not
direct the Court to any portion of the record or Exhibit H that they contend the trial court
erroneously excluded. Again, the Court need not consider an argument not supported by cogent
argument or authority. City oj Meridian, 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d at 257 (citations omitted).
The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in excluding evidence of
settlement negotiations.

Appellants' appeal on this claim presents no cogent argument or

authority otherwise.

12 The Court and counsel's colloquy regarding these Exhibits, as well as Mr. Clark's cross-examination ofMr.
Coleman with respect to the same appears in the record at Tr., Vol 2, p. 718, I. 21- p. 755, I. 7.
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IV.

The Issue of the Trial Court's Refusal to Instruct the Jury on Issues of
Fraud and Constructive Fraud Claims was not Preserved for Appeal

A. Standard of Review

On appeal, the "Court exercises free review when determining whether the district court
properly instructed the jury." Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho 161, 167, 158 P.3d 937,943 (2007)
(citing Gunter v. Murphy's Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho 16, 27, 105 P.3d 676, 687 (2005)).
"Regarding jury instructions, the standard of review is limited to a determination of whether the
instructions, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law. Id. (quoting

Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 287, 127 P.3d 187, 190 (2005)). "A requested jury
instruction need not be given ifit is either an erroneous statement of the law, adequately covered
by other instructions, or not supported by the facts of the case." Id. (quoting Craig Johnson, LLC
v. Floyd Town Architects, P.A., 142 Idaho 797, 800, 134 P.3d 648, 651 (2006)). Whether the jury

instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a question of
law over which this Court exercises free review. Perry v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med. Ctr., 134
Idaho 46,51,995 P.2d 816,821 (2000) (citing State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22,32,951 P.2d 1249,
1259 (1997)). "However, whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports an instruction to
the jury is within a trial court's discretion." !d.
B. Appellants have failed to state a cogent or cognizable claim for relief based upon
what Appellants claim were procedural errors to which Appellants failed to timely
object.

The issue framed by Appellants as a failure to instruct the jury on Appellants'
counterclaims for fraud and constructive fraud was not raised as an issue on appeal. R., p.
000782-786; R., p. 000823-827; and R., p. 001204-1207. Similarly, Appellants did not object to
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the failure of the trial court to give jury instructions upon Appellants' claims for fraud and
constructive fraud. See Tr., Vol. 3, p. 1556, 1. 6 - p. 1569, 1. 24. 13 Moreover, the trial court
entered its Second Amended Judgment and Decree, on August 6, 2012, resolving all issues
between the parties, including "all claims and defenses asserted by Counterclaimants." R., p.
00819-822. Despite filing two motions for a new trial and various other post-trial motions,
Appellants waited until nearly a year after the trial to raise an issue with respect to their fraud
and constructive fraud claims. See Hr'g April 10,2013, Hr'g Tr., p. 12,1. 13- p. 27, 1. 1.
Appellants concede the standard of review for an alleged error that was not the subject of
a timely objection, but subsequently ignore and fail to address the application of the standard to
this case. Instead, Appellants criticize the trial judge and neglect to take accountability for their
own failure to act upon this issue in any semblance of a timely fashion. Regardless of how the
issue is now framed, Appellants challenge the trial court's failure to give certain jury
instructions. Rule 51, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that the district court consider
requested jury instructions and further, that:
Prior to giving any opening or final instructions, the court shall
furnish copies of them to all parties and allow counsel a reasonable
time to examine them and make objections outside the presence of
the jury. No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to
give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to
which that party objects and the grounds of the objection.

13 Ironically enough, AppelIants did not submit proposed instructions upon their fraud and constructive fraud claims.
See AppelIants Second Motion to Augment the Record, granted by order of this Court on May 2, 2013, including
Defendants/Counterclaimants' Proposed Jury Instructions, filed January 23,2012 and Defendants/Counterclaimants'
Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions, filed February 3, 2012. Instead, Appellants appear to rely upon
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Proposed Jury Instructions for fraud and constructive fraud.
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LR.C.P.51(b).
Whether characterized as a [remarkably unsupported] constitutional argument with
respect to Rule 51 or as an appeal from a directed verdict, Appellants fundamentally "assign as
error the [] failure to give an instruction." LR.C.P. 51(b). Appellants did not object to the failure
to give jury instructions upon their fraud and constructive fraud claims and further failed to
appeal from what Appellants' now claim was a "directed verdict.,,14 As noted by the trial court,
"It wasn't a dismissal. It was an 'I'm not instructing on them,' as I recall." Hr'g April 10,2013,

Hr'g Tr., p. 21, 11. 20-21. Further, that "[it] is the obligation of counsel to either object to or get
it on the record and preserve the record and, if it's missing, to make the request within the
14

ej, Tr., Vol. 3., p. 1558 through 1568:
MS. JUDD: Your Honor, we will object to the court not giving instructions
proposed by plaintiffs 54 and 55 with respect to plaintiffs' affirmative fraud
claim ...
THE COURT: Thank you. And I note your objection. We did discuss this in
chambers. In part my ruling is based upon the proposition that, as I read the
proposed jury instructions, they didn't include an affirmative claim for fraud on
the part of the plaintiff; but also that, while there's sufficient evidence although I think it's thin to go to the jury for the affirmative defense of fraud, I
don't believe there was sufficient evidence to present the jury with an
affirmative claim of fraud. Therefore, I overruled the objection to the failure to
give those instructions.

MS. JUDD: Thank you, Your Honor. No further objections.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Clark?
MR. CLARK: Your Honor, I'd just like to note for the record we would have
preferred the court give us the promissory estoppel instruction because of the
lack of consideration jury instruction. And I would ask the court to give the SEC
definition of "executive officer." Other than that, we're happy. Thank you, Your
Honor.
Tr., Vol 3., p. 1566, I. 7 - p. 1567, I. 4.
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timeframe put forth in Rule 29, within the 28 days." Id., at p. 24, I. 25

p. 25, I. 3. The lack of a

record upon this issue rests solely with Appellants and cannot simply be remedied by asking the
district court to go back 16 months and draft findings based upon comments it made in a
chambers conference. 15 Ultimately, the district court refused to give certain jury instructions.
Rule 51, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, required Appellants to raise an objection to the failure
to give a particular jury instruction.
C. Appellants' claim that Rule 51(b) is unconstitutional is spectacularly unsupported.
Appellants' contention that Rule 51(b) is unconstitutional simply because Appellants
failed to comply with its directives is as absurd as it is unsupported. Appellants fail to cite to
identify any authority for this proposition. The Court need "not consider issues cited on appeal
that are not supported by propositions of law, authority or argument." City of Meridian, 154
Idaho 425,299 P.3d at 257 (citation omitted). "Put another way, even if an issue is explicitly set
forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing
and not supported by any cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered by this Court."
Id. (internal quotation omitted.)
D. The trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in refusing to give instructions
on fraud and constructive fraud.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Appellants had timely objected to the failure to give
instructions on fraud and constructive fraud, the trial court acted within the bounds of its
discretion in refusing to give instructions upon the same. Apart from asking this Court to weigh
15 "Because I remember going through jury instructions and saying I was not giving particular instructions, because I
didn't believe the evidence sustained them. And I cannot, from memory, obviously, tell you which those were."
Hr'g April 10, 20I3, Hr'g Tr., p. 15, II. 8-12.
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the evidence, Appellants fail to identify how the trial court abused its discretion in determining
"whether a reasonable view of the evidence supports an instruction to the jury." Perry, 134 Idaho
at 51, 995 P .2d at 821 (citation omitted).

Upon the after-the-fact review of the evidence

Appellants now rely upon, the claim for fraud is indistinguishable from the claim for breach of
contract: i.e, the parties had a contract for 50% ownership and Respondents, Dollars and Sense
and Profits Plus, breached the contract by failing to transfer ownership to Respondents.
Appellants' Brief, pgs. 44-49. The jury ultimately rejected this claim. Moreover, the claim that
"Street Search also established the constructive fraud requirement of an existing 'special
relationship," is made without any citation to the record or to authority. Again, as with many of
Appellants' claims, the Court need not consider issues which are unsupported by cogent
argument or authority. City a/Meridian, 154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d at 257 (citation omitted).
It is all but impossible to recall what occurred during a pretrial conference in January of

2012 and the reasons that the Court stated it declined to instruct the jury upon Appellants' claims
for fraud and constructive fraud. Appellants now seek to capitalize upon the lack of a record to
suggest that the trial court erred. Had Appellants, as required by Rule 51 (b), objected to the lack
of a jury instruction upon these theories, perhaps the record would be more clear. Instead, this
kind of after-the fact discussion as to jury instructions was not preserved for appeal and is
improper. See Rule 51(b), LR.C.P.
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v.

The Trial Court Acted within the Bounds of its Discretion in Refusing to
Instruct the Jury Regarding Promissory Estoppel

As with the claims for fraud and constructive fraud, the trial court acted within the
bounds of its discretion in declining to instruct the jury upon promissory estoppel. Apart from
acknowledging that the "determination of whether the instruction is so supported is committed to
the discretion of the district court," Appellants fail to apply this standard to the record or to
articulate how the trial court abused its discretion. Appellants' Brief, p. 49-52.

Instead,

Appellants appear to re-argue their fraud claim as an alternative to the contract claim submitted
to the jury. In this regard, the Court's decision in Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho
362,367-68, 109 P.3d 1104, 1109-10 (2005), is particularly instructive:
Lettunich argues promissory estoppel should be used in this case to
prevent KeyBank from denying the enforceability of an oral
promise. Again, there was no complete promise here to be
enforced. Promissory estoppel is simply a substitute for
consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between parties.
Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 68, 625 P.2d
417, 422 (1981). Consideration includes" action by the promisee
which is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise."
Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 Idaho 605, 607, 428 P.2d 524,526
(1967). It may also consist of a "detriment to the promisee or a
benefit to the promisor." Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel
Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599, 603, 514 P.2d 594, 598 (1973)
(citations omitted). In this case, Lettunich clearly suffered a
detriment when he purchased cattle without a way to pay for them.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is of no consequence in this
case because there is evidence of adequate consideration. What is
lacking is a sufficiently definite agreement. Black Canyon
Racquetball v. First Nat'l, 119 Idaho 171, 178,804 P.2d 900, 907
(1991).

Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367-68, 109 P.3d at 1109-10 (emphasis added); See also Smith v. Boise
Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63,625 P.2d 417 (1981) ("However, the doctrine of promissory
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estoppel is intended as a substitute for consideration, Mohr v. Shultz, supra, and not as a
substitute for an agreement between the parties." Id. at 68,625 P.2d at 422).
Here, the parties presented differing material terms of an alleged agreement. The jury
concluded that no contract existed.

As with Lettunich, promissory estoppel is inapplicable

where, as here, "what is lacking is a sufficiently definite agreement." Id. at 368, 109 P.3d at
1110. The trial court declined to give a jury instruction on promissory estoppel based upon its
finding that "I did not believe it would be appropriate in this case. It would do nothing more than
confuse the jury. I think the issues are well laid out for them, and the issue of consideration in
this case I don't believe is going to revolve on promissory estoppel." The court perceived the
issue as one of discretion, stated that consideration was not at issue, and acted within the bounds
of its discretion when it declined to instruct the jury upon the issue.

VI.

The Issue of Whether the Trial Court Acted within the Bounds of its
Discretion in Excluding Appellants' Exhibits MMM, NNN, and 000 is
Irrelevant.

As with Appellants' claim with regard to "Exhibit E," the Court reviews a trial court's
decision admitting or excluding evidence of damages offered pursuant to Appellants' Exhibits
MMM, NNN, and 000, under the abuse of discretion standard. White, 140 Idaho at 888, 104

P.3d at 362 (citations omitted). This issue is easily disposed of as irrelevant because Appellants
were unable to establish a contract between the parties, the existence of which was the only basis
for a finding of fiduciary duty, a breach thereof, or damages. City oj Meridian, 154 Idaho 425,
299 P.3d at 260-61. Appellants do not appeal from the jury verdict as to the existence of a
contract or from their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the same.
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R., p. 000782-786; R., p. 000823-827; and R., p. 001204-1207. "In order for the issue of
damages testimony to be relevant, a party must be able to establish liability." City of Meridian,
154 Idaho 425, 299 P.3d at 26l. Thus, the Court need not address this claim. Id.
VII.

Appellants are not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs

Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) allows for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing

lli!!1Y in a civil action to recover "in any commercial transaction." I.C. § 12-120(3). A
commercial transaction includes all transactions except those for personal or household
purposes.

See Idaho Code § 12-120(3). Here, the district court ruled that Respondents, the

prevailing parties, were entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to I.e. § 12-120(3) and
Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. R., p. 000797-807. Appellants do not appeal the trial
court's award of attorney fees - either as to the issue of entitlement or amount. Appellants have
failed to identify a legal or factual basis to reverse or remand this matter for further proceedings,
are not the prevailing parties, and are not entitled to attorney fees on appea1.
VIII. Respondents are Entitled to an Award of Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal.
On June 8, 2012, the trial court held that that Respondents were entitled to an award of
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and Rule 54, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. As noted
in the section _, supra, Appellants do not appeal the trial court's award of attorney fees. For the
reasons discussed herein, Respondents are likewise entitled to attorney fees on appea1. "The
attorney fee provisions of I.e. § 12-120 also govern on appea1." Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford,
Inc., 153 Idaho 149, 156,280 P.3d 176, 183 (2012) (citing Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord
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Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 721, 117 P.3d 130, 135 (2005)); See also Rule 41,

I.A.R.
VI. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Respondents respectfully requests that the Court uphold the
decision of the district court denying Appellants' motions to dismiss and denying Appellants'
motion for a new trial. Respondents further request that the Court uphold the trial court's
evidentiary rulings and deny Appellants' request for attorney fees on appeal.

Finally,

Respondents request the Court award Respondents' their attorney fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3).
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